US ambasassor to Honduras knew coup against Zelaya was illegal but supported it anyway

December , 2010 -- US ambasassor to Honduras knew coup against Zelaya was illegal but supported it anyway

On July 6, 2009, WMR reported on the involvement of the Obama administration and its ambassdor to Honduras, Hugo Llorens, a Bush holdover, in the coup against Honduran President Manuel Zelaya. In the following cable, dated July 24, 2009, Llorens admitted that the coup that he supported was illegal and that the present president, Porfirio Lobo, should have been ineligible to serve as president for ten years:

VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHTG #0645/01 2050023 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 240023Z JUL 09 FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0237 INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 0735 RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUMIAAA/USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000645 SIPDIS WHA FOR A/S TOM SHANNON L FOR HAROLD KOH AND JOAN DONOGHUE NSC FOR DAN RESTREPO E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM KJUS HO SUBJECT: TFHO1: OPEN AND SHUT: THE CASE OF THE HONDURAN COUP REF: TEGUCIGALPA 578 Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (b and d) 1. (C) Summary: Post has attempted to clarify some of the legal and constitutional issues surrounding the June 28 forced removal of President Manuel "Mel" Zelaya. The Embassy perspective is that there is no doubt that the military, Supreme Court and National Congress conspired on June 28 in what constituted an illegal and unconstitutional coup against the Executive Branch, while accepting that there may be a prima facie case that Zelaya may have committed illegalities and may have even violated the constitution. There is equally no doubt from our perspective that Roberto Micheletti's assumption of power was illegitimate. Nevertheless, it is also evident that the constitution itself may be deficient in terms of providing clear procedures for dealing with alleged illegal acts by the President and resolving conflicts between the branches of government. End summary. 2. (U) Since the June 28 removal and expulsion of President Zelaya by the Honduran armed forces, the Embassy has consulted Honduran legal experts (one cannot find a fully unbiased professional legal opinion in Honduras in the current politically charged atmosphere) and reviewed the text of the Honduran Constitution and its laws to develop a better understanding of the arguments being parlayed by the coup's supporters and opponents. ------------------------------- Arguments of the Coup Defenders ------------------------------- 3. (SBU) Defenders of the June 28 coup have offered some combination of the following, often ambiguous, arguments to assert it's legality: -- Zelaya had broken the law (alleged but not proven); -- Zelaya resigned (a clear fabrication); -- Zelaya intended to extend his term in office (supposition); -- Had he been allowed to proceed with his June 28 constitutional reform opinion poll, Zelaya would have dissolved Congress the following day and convened a constituent assembly (supposition); -- Zelaya had to be removed from the country to prevent a bloodbath; -- Congress "unanimously" (or in some versions by a 123-5 vote) deposed Zelaya; (after the fact and under the cloak of secrecy); and -- Zelaya "automatically" ceased to be president the moment he suggested modifying the constitutional prohibition on presidential reelection. 4. (C) In our view, none of the above arguments has any substantive validity under the Honduran constitution. Some are outright false. Others are mere supposition or ex-post rationalizations of a patently illegal act. Essentially: -- the military had no authority to remove Zelaya from the country; -- Congress has no constitutional authority to remove a Honduran president; -- Congress and the judiciary removed Zelaya on the basis of a hasty, ad-hoc, extralegal, secret, 48-hour process; -- the purported "resignation" letter was a fabrication and was not even the basis for Congress's action of June 28; and -- Zelaya's arrest and forced removal from the country violated multiple constitutional guarantees, including the prohibition on expatriation, presumption of innocence and right to due process. ------------------------------------------- Impeachment under the Honduran Constitution ------------------------------------------- 5. (U) Under the Honduran Constitution as currently written, the President may be removed only on the basis of death, resignation or incapacitation. Only the Supreme Court may determine that a President has been "incapacitated" on the basis of committing a crime. 6. (U) There is no explicit impeachment procedure in the 1982 Honduran Constitution. Originally, Article 205-15 stated that Congress had the competence to determine whether "cause" existed against the President, but it did not stipulate on what grounds or under what procedure. Article 319-2 stated that the Supreme Court would "hear" cases of official or common crimes committed by high-level officials, upon a finding of cause by the Congress. This implied a vague two-step executive impeachment process involving the other two branches of government, although without specific criteria or procedures. However, Article 205 was abrogated in 2003, and the corresponding provision of Article 319 (renumbered 313) was revised to state only that the Supreme Court would hear "processes initiated" against high officials. Thus, it appears that under the Constitution as currently written, removal of a president or a government official is an entirely judicial matter. 7. (U) Respected legal opinion confirms that the removal of a president is a judicial matter. According to a 2006 book by respected legal scholar Enrique Flores Valeriano -- late father of Zelaya's Minister of the Presidency, Enrique Flores Lanza -- Article 112 of the Law of Constitutional Justice indicates that if any government official is found to be in violation of the Constitution, that person should be removed from office immediately with the ultimate authority on matters of Constitutionality being the Supreme Court. 8. (U) Many legal experts have also confirmed to us that the Honduran process for impeaching a President or other senior-level officials is a judicial procedure. They assert that under Honduran law the process consists of formal criminal charges being filed by the Attorney General against the accused with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court could accept or reject the charges. If the Court moved to indict, it would assign a Supreme Court magistrate, or a panel of magistrates to investigate the matter, and oversee the trial. The trial process is open and transparent and the defendant would be given a full right of self-defense. If convicted in the impeachment trial, the magistrates have authority to remove the President or senior official. Once the President is removed, then the constitutional succession would follow. In this case, if a President is legally charged, convicted, and removed, his successor is the Vice President or what is termed the Presidential Designate. In the current situation in Honduras, since the Vice President, Elvin Santos, resigned last December in order to be able to run as the Liberal Party Presidential candidate, President Zelaya's successor would be Congress President Roberto Micheletti. Unfortunately, the President was never tried, or convicted, or was legally removed from office to allow a legal succession. ----------------------------- The Legal Case Against Zelaya ----------------------------- 9. (C) Zelaya's opponents allege that he violated the Constitution on numerous grounds, some of which appear on their face to be valid, others not: -- Refusing to submit a budget to the Congress: The Constitution is unambiguous that the Executive shall submit a proposed budget to Congress by September 15 each year (Art. 367), that Congress shall approve the budget (Art. 366) and that no obligations or payments may be effectuated except on the basis of an approved budget (Art. 364); -- Refusing to fund the Congress: Article 212 states that the Treasury shall apportion quarterly the funds needed for the operation of the Congress; -- Proposing an illegal constitutional referendum: The Constitution may be amended only through two-thirds vote of the Congress in two consecutive sessions (Art. 373 and 375); a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution, as Zelaya promoted, is therefore unconstitutional; however, it is not clear that proposing a constituent assembly in itself violates the constitution, only that any changes ensuing from that assembly would be invalid; -- Defying the judgment of a competent court: Zelaya insisted on pushing ahead with his constitutional reform opinion poll after both a first-instance court and an appeals court ordered him to suspend those efforts; however, while he clearly intended to follow through with the poll, he never actually did it; -- Proposing to reform unreformable articles: Since Zelaya's proposed constituent assembly would have unlimited powers to rewrite the constitution, it violated Article 374, which makes certain articles unamendable; once again, though, Zelaya never actually attempted to change the so-called "carved in stone" articles; it was only assumed he intended to; -- Dismissing the armed forces chief: The Supreme Court's Constitutional Hall ruled June 25 that Zelaya was in violation of the Constitution for dismissing Defense Chief Vasquez Velasquez; the Constitution (Art. 280) states that the President may freely name or remove the chief of the armed forces; but the court ruled that since Zelaya fired him for refusing to carry out a poll the court had ruled illegal, the firing was illegal. 10. (C) Although a case could well have been made against Zelaya for a number of the above alleged constitutional violations, there was never any formal, public weighing of the evidence nor any semblance of due process. ----------------------- The Article 239 Cannard ----------------------- 11. (U) Article 239, which coup supporters began citing after the fact to justify Zelaya's removal (it is nowhere mentioned in the voluminous judicial dossier against Zelaya), states that any official proposing to reform the constitutional prohibition against reelection of the president shall immediately cease to carry out their functions and be ineligible to hold public office for 10 years. Coup defenders have asserted that Zelaya therefore automatically ceased to be President when he proposed a constituent assembly to rewrite the Constitution. 12. (C) Post's analysis indicates the Article 239 argument is flawed on multiple grounds: -- Although it was widely assumed that Zelaya's reason for seeking to convoke a constituent assembly was to amend the constitution to allow for reelection, we are not aware that he ever actually stated so publicly; -- Article 239 does not stipulate who determines whether it has been violated or how, but it is reasonable to assume that it does not abrogate other guarantees of due process and the presumption of innocence; -- Article 94 states that no penalty shall be imposed without the accused having been heard and found guilty in a competent court; -- Many other Honduran officials, including presidents, going back to the first elected government under the 1982 Constitution, have proposed allowing presidential reelection, and they were never deemed to have been automatically removed from their positions as a result. 13. (C) It further warrants mention that Micheletti himself should be forced to resign following the logic of the 239 argument, since as President of Congress he considered legislation to have a fourth ballot box ("cuarta urna") at the November elections to seek voter approval for a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution. Any member of Congress who discussed the proposal should also be required to resign, and National Party presidential candidate Pepe Lobo, who endorsed the idea, should be ineligible to hold public office for 10 years. --------------------------------------------- - Forced Removal by Military was Clearly Illegal --------------------------------------------- - 14. (C) Regardless of the merits of Zelaya's alleged constitutional violations, it is clear from even a cursory reading that his removal by military means was illegal, and even the most zealous of coup defenders have been unable to make convincing arguments to bridge the intellectual gulf between "Zelaya broke the law" to "therefore, he was packed off to Costa Rica by the military without a trial." -- Although coup supporters allege the court issued an arrest warrant for Zelaya for disobeying its order to desist from the opinion poll, the warrant, made public days later, was for him to be arrested and brought before the competent authority, not removed from the county; -- Even if the court had ordered Zelaya to be removed from the country, that order would have been unconstitutional; Article 81 states that all Hondurans have the right to remain in the national territory, subject to certain narrow exceptions spelled out in Article 187, which may be invoked only by the President of the Republic with the agreement of the Council of Ministers; Article 102 states that no Honduran may be expatriated; -- The armed forces have no/no competency to execute judicial orders; originally, Article 272 said the armed forces had the responsibility to "maintain peace, public order and the 'dominion' of the constitution," but that language was excised in 1998; under the current text, only the police are authorized to uphold the law and execute court orders (Art. 293); -- Accounts of Zelaya's abduction by the military indicate he was never legally "served" with a warrant; the soldiers forced their way in by shooting out the locks and essentially kidnapped the President. 15. (U) The Armed Forces' ranking legal advisor, Col. Herberth Bayardo Inestroza, acknowledged in an interview published in the Honduran press July 5 that the Honduran Armed Forces had broken the law in removing Zelaya from the country. That same day it was reported that the Public Ministry was investigating the actions of the Armed Forces in arresting and deporting Zelaya June 28 and that the Supreme Court had asked the Armed Forces to explain the circumstances that motivated his forcible exile. 16. (C) As reported reftel, the legal adviser to the Supreme Court told Poloff that at least some justices on the Court consider Zelaya's arrest and deportation by the military to have been illegal. ------------------------------------------ Congress Had no Authority to Remove Zelaya ------------------------------------------ 17. (C) As explained above, the Constitution as amended in 2003 apparently gives sole authority for removing a president to the judiciary. The Congressional action of June 28 has been reported in some media as acceptance of Zelaya's resignation, based on a bogus resignation letter dated June 25 that surfaced after the coup. However, the June 28 Congressional resolution makes no mention of the letter, nor does it state that Congress was accepting Zelaya's resignation. It says Congress "disapproves" of Zelaya's conduct and therefore "separates" him from the office of President -- a constitutional authority Congress does not have. Furthermore, a source in the Congressional leadership told us that a quorum was not present when the resolution was adopted, rendering it invalid. There was no recorded vote, nor a request for the "yeas" and "nays." 18. (C) In sum, for a constitutional succession from Zelaya to Micheletti to occur would require one of several conditions: Zelaya's resignation, his death, or permanent medical incapacitation (as determined by judicial and medical authorities), or as discussed previously, his formal criminal conviction and removal from office. In the absence of any of these conditions and since Congress lacked the legal authority to remove Zelaya, the actions of June 28 can only be considered a coup d'etat by the legislative branch, with the support of the judicial branch and the military, against the executive branch. It bears mentioning that, whereas the resolution adopted June 28 refers only to Zelaya, its effect was to remove the entire executive branch. Both of these actions clearly exceeded Congress's authority. ------- Comment ------- 19. (C) The analysis of the Constitution sheds some interesting light on the events of June 28. The Honduran establishment confronted a dilemma: near unanimity among the institutions of the state and the political class that Zelaya had abused his powers in violation of the Constitution, but with some ambiguity what to do about it. Faced with that lack of clarity, the military and/or whoever ordered the coup fell back on what they knew -- the way Honduran presidents were removed in the past: a bogus resignation letter and a one-way ticket to a neighboring country. No matter what the merits of the case against Zelaya, his forced removal by the military was clearly illegal, and Micheletti's ascendance as "interim president" was totally illegitimate. 20. (C) Nonetheless, the very Constitutional uncertainty that presented the political class with this dilemma may provide the seeds for a solution. The coup's most ardent legal defenders have been unable to make the intellectual leap from their arguments regarding Zelaya's alleged crimes to how those allegations justified dragging him out of his bed in the night and flying him to Costa Rica. That the Attorney General's office and the Supreme Court now reportedly question the legality of that final step is encouraging and may provide a face-saving "out" for the two opposing sides in the current standoff. End Comment. LLORENS

Lebanon's Al Akhbar newspaper has released State Department cables not previously released by Wikileaks. The Wikileaks saga has grown more mysterious. Two examples of the Lebanese paper's cable haul follows:

ClassificationSECRET//NOFORN Header VZCZCXYZ0002 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHRB #0679/01 2181914 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 061914Z AUG 09 FM AMEMBASSY RABAT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0538 INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 3210 RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 0115 Content S E C R E T RABAT 000679 SIPDIS NOFORN STATE FOR S/CT, NEA/MAG AND DRL/NESCA E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2019 TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PTER, KISL, MO SUBJECT: LANDMARK TERRORISM CASE RAISES HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS REF: A. 08 RABAT 0311 (NOTAL) B. 08 RABAT 0178 (NOTAL) C. 08 RABAT 0222 (NOTAL) D. RABAT 0543 (NOTAL) Classified By: CDA Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary: On July 28, a Sale court sentenced Moroccan-Belgian Abdelkader Belleraj to life in prison (instead of the death penalty requested by prosecutors) for running an international terrorist network. The 34 other defendants on trial with Belleraj received sentences ranging from one to 30 years. While Belleraj and some of his associates undoubtedly had links to terrorism, the link is much less clear for six Islamist politicians, who received sentences ranging from two to 25 years. These six politicians have come to be known in the public and the press as "political detainees" because of allegations that they were arrested for their political affiliation rather than any real connection to terrorist acts. Human rights activists monitoring this case have condemned the trial and the verdict. A family member of one of the politicians sentenced to 20 years called the trial a "farce" and wondered, in the context of celebrations of King Mohammed VI's ten years of rule, "How can this be possible in the new Morocco?" End Summary. ---------- Background ---------- 2. (C) In February 2008, Minister of the Interior Chakib Benmoussa publicly announced the dismantling of a dangerous terrorist network, masterminded by Moroccan-Belgian Abdelkader Belleraj. Belleraj was arrested for possessing an arsenal of firearms, allegedly to be used to assassinate Moroccan ministers, members of the military, and Jewish citizens. He is suspected of having committed at least six assassinations in Europe, as well as conducting arms trafficking, money laundering, robberies and other crimes (Ref A). The 34 other men arrested in connection with the network were charged with crimes such as "disturbing the national security of the State" and "conspiracy to plot and carry out terrorist acts," the highest crimes under Moroccan terrorism laws. ------------------- The Six Politicians ------------------- 3. (C) While there is little doubt that Belleraj and some of his associates have committed grave crimes, the public and media have labeled six of the defendants "political detainees" because of allegations that they were arrested for their political affiliation rather than for having any real connection to terrorist actions or intentions. While the Embassy and other diplomatic missions do not dispute the prima facie threat from Belleraj, who has a long history of relations with Islamic radicals from Ayatollah Khomeini to Osama bin Laden, there appears to be little evidence that the six politicians had any involvement in planning terrorist acts. Nevertheless, the GOM persisted in trying all of the accused together under the anti-terrorism laws enacted after the May 2003 suicide attacks in Casablanca, dismissing repeated attempts by lawyers to separate the trials of the six from the larger group. As a result, the politicians were charged, like the other members of the group, with involvement in terrorist activity, including plotting against the regime, being a member of an armed group with the objective of destabilizing the nation, and threatening public safety -- among the most severe crimes under Morocco's terrorism laws. 4. (U) Five of the politicians affiliated with Islamist-inspired political parties at the time of their arrest were sentenced to 20 and 25 years in prison. Maelainin Laabadla, a Sahrawi member of the national council of the Islamist-inspired Party of Justice and Development (PJD), headed the PJD's commission on the Western Sahara; Mustafa Moatassim served as Secretary General of the Civilized Alternative (Al Badil Al Hadari), a small, Islamist-inspired political party which was disbanded two days after his arrest; Mohamed Marouani and Amine Regala had been, respectively, the Secretary General and party spokesperson of the unauthorized party of the Nation (Al Oumma), an Islamist organization that had been seeking party status; and Abdelhafid Sriti worked as a television correspondent for Hezbollah's Al Manar. 5. (SBU) The sixth politician, Hamid Najibi, a member of the national council of the Unified Socialist Party (PSU), and the only politician not affiliated with an Islamist party, received a suspended sentence of two years. International reaction to the heavy sentences of the politicians has been mostly shock, especially given the skepticism increasingly voiced by the press and public regarding the case. --------------------------- Political Links to Belleraj --------------------------- 6. (C) In the early 1990's, under the reign of King Hassan II, at least four of the six politicians belonged to an organization called Islamic Choice, an Islamic cultural and political organization. For ideological reasons, Islamic Choice eventually dissolved and then split into two smaller Islamist political parties, the Civilized Alternative and the Nation. According to Moroccan government officials, Belleraj and his co-conspirators hoped to use these parties as the foundation of a new political wing of their network, and then, under the guise of political activity, use them to destabilize Morocco (Ref B). 7. (C) At the time of the arrests, the Civilized Alternative had been formally recognized by the GOM, and, according to Sidi Ali Maelainin, the brother of Mr. Laabadla, had been encouraged as an alternative to the Islamist-inspired PJD, until the terrorist network was uncovered. The Nation had applied for and was awaiting approval as a political organization at the time of the arrests in February 2008. Because it had not yet received an official refusal, it was on the verge of becoming a party by default, Maelainin said. He speculated that the GOM opposed the recognition of the Nation because it could open the way for Sheik Yassine's Islamist Justice and Good Works Organization (al-Adl wa al-Ihsan or AWI) to enter politics -- a move strongly opposed by the Palace. -------------------- A Message to the PJD -------------------- 8. (C) Relatives of the politicians, and increasingly the press, suggest that the arrest of the six political defendants was designed to deter the proliferation of Islamist politicians and political parties, rather than terrorist acts. As reported, shortly after the arrests of the six politicians, even the PJD acknowledged that the arrests may have been intended as a message to stay in line (Ref C). The PJD has denounced the verdicts against the politicians, suggesting that such punishments evoke the authoritarian reign of Hassan II and the &Years of Lead.8 9. (C) According to Abdelaziz Nouyidi, a prominent human rights attorney and member of the defense team, the arrest and trial of Islamist political figures was timed to send a clear message to the political parties in the lead up to the June 2009 local elections. "The Palace wanted to remind the Islamists to stay within the bounds established by the King," he said, continuing that an alliance between the PJD and the left would not be welcome. Nouyidi speculated that the inclusion among the defendants of Hamid Najibi of the Unified Socialist Party signaled the Palace's displeasure at the prospect of such an alliance. --------------------------- Evidence and Irregularities --------------------------- 10. (C) According to human rights NGOs, defense attorneys and European diplomats familiar with the case, the state's evidence against all 35 of the accused consisted of the defendants' statements to the police in which they implicate themselves and others, and two seizures of weapons which were allegedly intended to be used to conduct assassinations and other terrorist acts. The defendants initially affirmed their statements before a preliminary judge, but then retracted them before the trial judge, saying they had been obtained under duress or had been altered. 11. (S/NF) The judge's written decision on the case has not yet been made available, and it is, therefore, not clear what, if any, other evidence the GOM may have against the accused. The Moroccan Government provided to the Regional Affairs Office photographs of the seized weapons which included guns, ammunition, silencers, and balaclavas. Despite repeated requests, the GOM did not provide satisfactory evidence to the Mission of a connection between the politicians and the terrorist network. Daniel Bernard, Belgian Legal Advisor to the Government of Morocco, who has closely followed this case, speculated, "Maybe there is something behind the accusations" of the six politicians, but if so, the Moroccan Government has not divulged it to anyone. 12. (C) Calling the trial and prosecution of his brother "a farce," Sidi Ali Maelainin outlined for PolOff other irregularities in the case. The judge had repeatedly refused to allow the defense access to files, to call witnesses or to introduce evidence, he said, accusations confirmed by Bernard. In addition, nearly all the defendants alleged that their statements had been altered by the police. The Charge raised these concerns in his June 24 meeting with Human Rights Council Chairman Ahmed Herzenni, who acknowledged the irregularities and promised to review the trial following delivery of the verdict (Ref D). ------------- No Fair Trial ------------- 13. (C) Calling the trial "pre-cooked," Johan Jacobs, Counselor at the Belgian Embassy, said there is "no doubt" the trial was unfair. Not a single person had been acquitted, he observed, an unlikely outcome given the large number of defendants. He also questioned how an impartial judge could reach a verdict and determine sentences for 35 different individuals less than 12 hours after the closing arguments. He told PolOff that some of the evidence used in the trial had been provided by Belgium and was written in French and Dutch. Even though the evidence provided by Brussels was accurate and, in some cases damning, Jacobs wondered how the trial could be fair if neither the defense nor the prosecution could understand it. When the defense requested to have the files translated into Arabic, the court ruled that only parts of the files could be translated, orally, during court proceedings. This is a peculiar way of honoring a defendant's right to know the evidence against him, he said, adding, "Some of these guys have real proof against them, but that does not change the fact that the trial was unfair." Sidi Ali Maelainin called the lack of a fair trial "frightening." In the context of national celebration of the reforms initiated by King Mohammed VI over the last ten years, he wondered, "How can this be possible in the new Morocco?" ------- Comment ------- 14. (C) The GOM's heavy-handed approach taken by the GOM in this case illustrates Morocco's willingness to use its counterterrorism laws to marginalize Islamist-inspired political activities. The nearly universal belief that the verdict of this trial was predetermined by the Ministry of the Interior -- a not unlikely scenario -- highlights the lack of trust many Moroccans have in the justice system. Equally troubling for Morocco's governance reform outlook is the plausible prospect that at least six defendants were tried and convicted for political reasons unrelated to zealous counter-terrorism objectives. If true, this would represent a manipulation of the courts not only for security goals but also to affect legitimate political activity -- a step backward in the political and democratic progress the Kingdom has realized in the past decade. Although the GOM has made great progress in respecting human rights under King Mohammed VI, there is still room for improvement, particularly in respecting non-establishment viewpoints. End Comment. ***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco

O 171334Z FEB 09 FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8138 INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY Content C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000138 NOFORN SECSTATE AF - A/DAS BOULWARE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2021 TAGS: PREL, USAU, PGOV, MR, IS SUBJECT: MAURITANIAN RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL REF: A. STATE 14163 B. NOUAKCHOTT 6 C. NOUAKCHOTT 47 D. NOUAKCHOTT 101 E. NOUAKCHOTT 118 Classified By: CDA Cornelius Walsh, reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 1. (C/NF) Summary: Having watched the evolution of the Israeli relations issue in the context of the Mauritanian political crisis, we believe that the junta, particularly Foreign Minister Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, is deeply concerned about the repercussions of a formal break in the Mauritanian-Israeli relationship. Their steps to date, while detrimental to Israeli interests, have been incremental and hesitant. However, given the volatile nature of the issue, American engagement at this very sensitive time may be used by more radical members of the junta and its constituents, who have a planning horizon much more limited than that of the Foreign Minister, as a pretext to sever the relationship and free Mauritania from what they consider its onerous restraints. End Summary. 2. (U) Since the advent of the coup d'etat in early August, Embassy Nouakchott has observed and reported on the junta's approach towards relations with Israel as well as the attitudes and statements of other participants in the current political crisis affecting Mauritania. Inasmuch as Israeli Ambassador Arbel had not presented his credentials prior to the coup and that Israel hewed to the western policy of non-recognition, this kept the issue off the table for some months. Always a delicate subject, it appeared that both the junta and its opponents preferred that the issue not enter their political world. 3. (U) The late December Israeli incursion into Gaza, however, changed the nature of the discussion. The junta found itself pressured by its domestic constituency, its opponents, and fellow Muslim states to cut relations with Israel as a show of solidarity with Gaza and the Muslim mainstream. Indeed, it appears that some states offered recognition and financial support for just such a gesture. Large and sometimes violent anti-Israeli demonstrations focused on the Israeli Embassy in Nouakchott further forced the junta to address the issue. On the domestic front the junta appeared to be in a competition with its opponents as to which could be more anti-Israel than the other. 4. (C/NF) Despite these pressures, the junta has proceeded slowly and very carefully in its measures against the Israeli presence. It has recalled its Ambassador (Ref B), declared a freeze in relations (Ref C), almost surreptitiously closed its Embassy in Tel Aviv and removed its personnel (Ref D), and finally two weeks ago informally called the Israeli Ambassador and asked that he take "appropriate measures" regarding the freeze (Ref E). As of February 16, the Israeli Ambassador has not been contacted again by the junta's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 5. (C/NF) We have sometimes considered the junta's steps to be an attempt to have its cake and eat it as well, i.e., give the appearance of distancing itself from Israel while maintaining a straightened relationship. However, its hesitancy, its apparent rejection of blandishments from Iran, Libya and other players, and its rhetorical back and forth with the opposition lead us to believe that the junta is well aware of the serious consequences of an actual break in diplomatic relations. The formal break is indeed a card that the junta may wish to play at some point. However, indications until now have been that it will not do so without a pretext or an action that will allow it to gain an advantage either from international partners (it already has anti-sanction support from the Arab League) or against its domestic opponents. 6. (C/NF) Intervention at this point may be the pretext the junta desires/needs to make its final break. Using a USG reminder as the focus of its rupture would burnish the junta's "eastern" credentials with a number of Muslim states. Having identified the United States as the most adamant of its international critics, the junta would also be tempted to use such an intervention to undermine our democratic credentials with the Abdallahi administration, the FNDD, and other parties with whom we have worked throughout the past six months. There are those, evidenced, in a recent article in a minor local newspaper "Points Chauds" who choose to see the sanctions question and the internationalization of the Mauritanian crisis as (in the words of the paper's headline) "the Jewish lobby against the Arab pressure group, who will have the last word?" We would therefore recommend that the request outlined in Ref A be reconsidered. 7. (C/NF) Comment: In our conversations with the Israeli Ambassador we sense that the GOI does not realize that the full spectrum of political opinion in Mauritania, junta, anti-junta, and opportunistic, is opposed to continuing relations with Israel. The sole factor that has kept the junta from a full breach is its understanding that such a move would make its relations with the United States and the west that much more difficult. This is understood as well by the opposition parties which, while goading the junta to take action, do not make such a break a sine qua non in their own position papers. In our view, the Israelis could garner possible good will in the future were they to follow the Mauritanian lead and depart quietly and unofficially to return just as quietly when conditions here and in the Middle East improve. There is, of course, the danger that this would be another pretext for a formal break but there is also the possibility that the junta and/or any follow-on administration would consider such discretion as a positive factor in the future. End Comment. HANKINS